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than just the 74 acres owned by Wheatland, unless the DWR demonstrated a voluntary reduction of rights.
The DWR interpreted the decision of the district court as creating a
requirement that the DWR determine whether Wheatland had abandoned its rights. Subsequently, the DWR found that Wheatland had
effectively abandoned 196 of the 280 original acres by converting the 196
acres to non-irrigable acreage. Wheatland again requested review by the
district court, which held permissible a limitation of water rights during a
change-of-use proceeding, but not a partial abandonment of a water right.
Both Wheatland and DWR appealed the decision of the district court.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Kansas ("appellate court") addressed two issues: 1) whether to allow the original consumptive-use limitation; and 2) whether a declaration of a partial abandonment of a water
right violated state statute. The appellate court looked to the language of
the Kansas Water Appropriation Act ("Act") and concluded that the public interest in conserving water in change-of-use cases outweighed the any
harm caused by the limitation of Wheatland's water rights. As such, the
court held that the chief engineer had authority to impose consumptiveuse limitation and had done so reasonably in this case.
Further, the appellate court held that, based on the plain meaning of
the language in the Act, the DWA did not have the authority to declare a
partial abandonment of a water right. The test for whether a right holder
has abandoned a right requires a determination that the holder has made
no beneficial use of any of the water right for a total of five years. Thus,
the appellate court held the concept of a partial abandonment was contrary to the plain meaning of the statute and thus a decree of such a partial abandonment was impermissible.
Ultimately, the appellate court held that the DWA had the authority
to impose a consumptive-use limitation when approving a change-of-use
application, but did not have the authority to limit the consumptive use of
a water right by declaring a partial abandonment of that water right. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the district court
and remanded the case back to the district court.

Kelly Delaney

MONTANA
Conner v. City of Dillon, 270 P.3d 75 (Mont. 2012) (holding that (i)
an implied contract may be found between a City and a property owner
for the provision of water service when certain conduct by the parties
supported a finding of the existence of a contract; and (ii) a local ordinance immunizing the City from suit for intentional, maintenance-related
service interruptions does not apply when the interruption was due to
natural events).
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This was an appeal to the Supreme Court of Montana ("court") of the
Fifth Judicial District Court, County of Beaverhead's ("district court")
decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the City of Dillon, Montana ("City").
Robert and Patricia McNeill ("McNeill") owned land outside of the
City. In 1981, McNeill and the City entered into a contract for the City
to connect McNeill's property to the Rattlesnake Creek water main for
domestic water supply ("1981 Agreement"). The 1981 Agreement only
allowed the connection of "one water service." In 1994, McNeill decided
to subdivide the lot and sell the new parcel, so McNeill applied to the
City for a second water service. The City rejected the application for
"lack of information." In 1997, McNeill completed the subdivision and
sold the new lot, dividing the water tap from the original lot to serve both
lots. As part of the subdivision process, a letter from the City's Mayor to
the Montana Department of Environmental Quality authorized McNeill
to provide water to the new lot via the divided water tap. The City installed a water meter on the new lot and began billing the lot's new
owner.
Conner purchased the new lot in 2004 and timely paid its City-issued
water bills through 2008. In the winter of 2008, Rattlesnake Creek and
the water main froze, depriving Conner of water for weeks. In response,
the City unsuccessfully attempted to dig a well and thaw the main to provide Conner water, and ultimately offered Connor a water storage tank,
but Connor refused the tank. The City then provided Connor a portable
toilet and bottled water until water service was restored.
In 2010, Conner sued the City in district court for breach of contract,
negligence, and infliction of emotional distress over the water outage.
The City moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the City, agreeing with a Special Master's
findings that (i) no contract existed between the City and Conner; and (ii)
a City ordinance barred the negligence action because the ordinance allowed the City to shut off its water mains without it constituting an actionable service interruption.
Connor appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for
the City, claiming (i) while the City and Conner did not have an express
contract, they still had an implied contract for the second water service;
and (ii) the City ordinance did not bar Conner's negligence claim because
the City did not turn off the water main for the purposes contemplated in
the ordinance.
The court first considered whether an implied contract existed between Connor and the City such that City was required to provide water
service to Conner. Under Montana law, a court may find an implied contract between parties when one of the parties establishes the parties' ability to contract; the parties' consent; the lawful object of the contract; and
sufficient consideration. The court focused its analysis on the third element, lawful object of the contract, because the parties did not dispute
the other elements. The court focused on the Special Master's report
that no lawful object of the contract existed because the 1981 Agreement
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merely established one water service and the City rejected the request for
a second water service. The court, however, acknowledged that the parties' conduct may establish a lawful object of an implied contract and estop another party from ignoring its contractual duties.
The court ultimately determined that the parties had a lawful object
for an implied contract because Conner's claim was not barred under the
1981 Agreement because Conner was not party to the 1981 Agreement.
Further, because a party's conduct may manifest the terms and existence
of an implied contract, despite the City's initial denial of the second water
service to McNeill, it later approved the service, installed a water meter in
the new lot, and billed Conner for water service. Accordingly, court held
that Conner and the City did have an implied contract for water service to
Conner's property.
Second, the court considered the City's claim that a local ordinance
barred Conner's tort and contract claims. The ordinance provides that
suits against the City for service interruption are barred when the City
shuts off its water mains for "repairs or extensions or for any other purpose." The court determined that in this case, the City did not take any
affirmative steps to turn off water service, but rather service was cut off
due to a natural event, the freeze. Therefore, the court held the ordinance inapplicable to the present case and not a bar to Conner's claim.
Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment for the City and remanded the case to the district court for additional proceedings.

Michael Bilings

Mont Trout Unlimited v. Beaverhead Water Co., 255 P.3d 179
(Mont. 2011) (holding that in water adjudication proceedings a state
agency is not the sole representative for public recreational and conservation interests; individuals or private interest groups with at least a reasonable minimal ownership interest in water that may be adversely impacted
are entitled to a hearing on their objections).
This is an appeal from the Water Court's Temporary Preliminary
Decree ("decree") dismissing Montana Trout Unlimited's ("MTU") objections to Beaverhead Water Company, Garrison Ranches, and the Paul
H. Cleary, Jr. Trust's (collectively "Beaverhead") water rights claims for
the Big Hole River Basin ("Big Hole"). MTU specifically appealed on
two issues: (1) whether the Water Court erred in holding that only the
Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks ("the DFWP") may
represent public recreational and conservation interests in water adjudication proceedings; and (2) whether the Water Court erred in holding that
only water rights claimants may request a hearing on their objections in
water adjudication proceedings.
First, the Montana Supreme Court ("Court") considered the Water
Court's application of statutory law, which provided in relevant part that
the DFWP would serve as the public's exclusive representative in water

